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Assessing the Constitutionality of Legislation: 
Constitutional Review in Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan 
Brian Christopher Jones 
Abstract 
This article examines the constitutional interpretative authority of Taiwan’s Legislative 
Yuan, while incorporating international viewpoints on constitutional review, primarily 
from the United Kingdom and the United States. It contends that Taiwan possesses an over-
reliance on legal constitutionalism and strong judicial review, which hinders the 
Legislative Yuan’s interpretative authority. Author interviews from Legislative Yuan 
insiders demonstrate that lawmakers and staffers may not actively be thinking about the 
constitutionality of the bills they are presenting and that they possess few, if any, official 
consultation options when seeking advice on constitutional questions. In essence, the 
interviews displayed clear evidence of judicial overhang. The article further argues that 
constitutional review by legislatures is an inherent good and provides multiple avenues for 
the Legislative Yuan to increase their constitutional interpretative authority. It also calls 
for more nominations to Taiwan’s Constitutional Court to be made from members with 
elected political experience and for the Court to acknowledge (at some level) the 
legislature’s interpretative authority. After all, democratic constitutional structures are 
dynamic and Taiwan’s governmental branches should work to bridge the divide between 
legal and political constitutionalism, before the former becomes even more firmly 
entrenched. 
I. Introduction
Democracies often tinker with mechanisms of constitutional governance. One of the 
current topics debated regarding such mechanisms is how involved legislatures should be 
in the constitutional assessment of laws. While some jurisdictions display strong 
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parliamentary authority with weak judicial review (for example, the United Kingdom 
(‘UK’)), others incorporate strong judicial review with decreased legislative or 
parliamentary authority (for example, the United States (‘US’)). Yet no matter the 
governmental structure, it is now widely held that most legislatures have the capacity and 
authority to perform at least some constitutional review of bills and statutes, however 
limited or extensive.1 As Vermeule states, ‘[c]onstitutional interpretation in representative 
legislatures must lie near the core of any account of democratic deliberation’.2  Many 
jurisdictions have taken steps to address the legislature’s capacity to interpret the 
constitution—that is, by increasing constitutional deliberation—and also by assessing the 
fit of legislation with constitutions, statutes and international conventions. 
Underlying principles of constitutional review are questions of governance, 
especially in regard to legal and political constitutionalism and how countries go about 
balancing such standards. Essentially the question becomes one of ‘precisely how the 
government should be held to account’,3 and where supremacy lies: with the legislature or 
the judiciary.4 Some jurisdictions put more faith in courts and judicial review, while others 
                                                 
1 See generally P Brest, ‘The Conscientious Legislator’s Guide to Constitutional Interpretation’ (1975) 27 
Stanford Law Review 585; WF Murphy, ‘Who Shall Interpret? The Quest for the Ultimate Constitutional 
Interpreter’ (1986) 48 Review of Politics 401; L Fisher, Constitutional Dialogues: Interpretation As Political 
Process (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1988); B Ackerman, We The People, Volume 1: Foundations 
(Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1993); M Tushnet, Taking The Constitution Away from the Courts 
(Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1999); J Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1999); J Waldron, The Dignity of Legislation (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999); E 
Garrett and A Vermeule, ‘Institutional Design of a Thayerian Congress’ (2000–2001) 50 Duke Law Journal 
1277; N Devins and L Fisher, The Democratic Constitution (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004); N 
Devins and KE Whittington (eds.), Congress and the Constitution (Duke University Press, Durham, 2005); 
A Vermeule, Mechanisms of Democracy (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007). 
2 Vermeule (note 1, above), p 217.  
3 M Elliott and R Thomas, Public Law, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011), p 38.  
4 R Bellamy, ‘Political Constitutionalism and the Human Rights Act’ (2011) 9 International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 86 at 89. 
  
 
put more faith in governmental institutions and the political process, although ‘[q]uite 
sensibly, few countries put all of their eggs in one basket’.5  
This article focuses on Taiwan, who may indeed have all of their eggs in one 
basket.6 Taiwan’s Constitutional Court (or ‘Council of Grand Justices’) incorporates strong 
judicial review and the legislature has limited formal mechanisms by which to assess the 
constitutionality of the bills and laws it scrutinises. Although Taiwan officially operates on 
a Presidential system, in reality it is more of a hybrid between parliamentary and 
presidential (that is, ‘semi-presidential’).7 Lately there have been calls to officially change 
the system to a Parliamentary model, but little movement on this has occurred. 8 
Nevertheless, Taiwan’s Constitutional Court takes a firm position as the state’s sole 
provider of highly centralised constitutional review,9 and statistics back this up. From 
1994–2013 the Court declared 95 acts, or more specifically provisions of particular acts, 
unconstitutional,10 amounting to 39 percent of the constitutional challenges to laws and 
acts they have decided.11 To put this in perspective, in a span of two centuries (1803–2002), 
the US Supreme Court only declared 158 Congressional acts, or provisions of acts, 
                                                 
5 Elliott and Thomas (note 3 above), p 21. Emphasis added.  
6 Ginsburg notes that constitutional review is exclusively carried out by the Council of Grand Justices 
(T Ginsburg, Judicial Review in New Democracies (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003), p 116). 
While lower courts can hear constitutional cases and refuse to apply regulations or other secondary measures 
they deem unconstitutional, only the Constitutional Court can strike down statutes.  
7 CF Lo, The Legal Culture and System of Taiwan, (Kluwer, Netherlands, 2006), p 4.  
8 C Wang, ‘DPP Cautious on Parliament Model, but Debate Needed’, Taipei Times, 20 May 2014.  
9 See Ginsburg (note 6 above), pp 115–144. See also CC Lin, ‘The Birth and Rebirth of the Judicial Review 
in Taiwan—Its Establishment, Empowerment, and Evolvement’ (2012) 7 National Taiwan University Law 
Review 157 at 198–209. 
10 Institutum Iurisprudentiae Academia Sinica (IIAS), Taiwan Constitutional Court (TCC) Database (2015), 
available at http://www.els.iias.sinica.edu.tw/iias/public/. However, 40 of the 95 acts declared 
unconstitutional from 1994–2013 were enacted (or went into effect) before the Legislature was fully 
democratically elected in 1992.   
11 Ibid From 1994–2013, there were 244 cases regarding laws/acts before the court. The court ruled 131 
(53.69%) constitutional, 95 (38.93%) unconstitutional and 18 (7.38%) neither constitutional nor 
unconstitutional.  
  
 
unconstitutional.12 Thus, within two decades, Taiwan’s Constitutional Court has gone two-
thirds of the way to what took the US Supreme Court two centuries to achieve. Furthermore, 
challenging and striking down legislative provisions does not appear to be abating: in 2013, 
the Constitutional Court declared eight laws, or provisions of laws, unconstitutional.13 
Here it is contended that Taiwan is currently too heavily focused on legal 
constitutionalism, thus hindering the constitutional assessment of bills travelling through 
the legislative process. This over-focus on legal constitutionalism was seen in the author’s 
interviews with lawmakers and staffers of the Legislative Yuan, presented below. Though 
formal and practical barriers stand in the way, Taiwan’s legislature possesses the necessary 
means by which to increase the institution’s constitutional interpretative authority, should 
the body choose to do so. In fact, legislatures in democratic systems may well demand such 
an increase in authority.14 
The article unfolds in the following manner. First, it briefly discusses the 
complexities of comparing law-making systems, noting differences between Taiwan’s 
constitutional structure and the other institutions consulted in this article. Next, it talks 
about constitutional review generally and interpretive authority for legislatures specifically, 
focusing on the UK Parliament, the US Congress and other legislatures. Then, it 
incorporates an empirical component, using interview material obtained from Taiwanese 
Legislative Yuan insiders to address whether and how lawmakers and their staff think about 
                                                 
12 A 2002 Government Printing Office document tracked how many acts (and provisions) the Supreme Court 
of the United States (SCOTUS) has struck down through 2002. It is available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-CONAN-2002/pdf/GPO-CONAN-2002-10.pdf. Importantly, however, 
this figure is only in relation to Acts of Congress and does not include state laws, which would significantly 
increase the total.  
13 IIAS TCC Database (note 10 above). Also, there were only 12 petitions regarding such cases that year, 
which means that the court struck down laws 66% of the time.  
14 Vermeule (note 1 above), p 217.  
  
 
and assess the constitutionality of the laws they are drafting and voting on. Finally, the 
article offers proposals on how to enhance the interpretative authority of the Legislative 
Yuan, with the hope of striking more of a balance between legal and political 
constitutionalism.  
Before this, however, a short note on the paper’s comparative methodology is in 
order. At times this article incorporates methods and ideas from other jurisdictions, such 
as the UK and US. This is no accident. In the face of what many consider a stronger 
judiciary,15 Westminster has set up a Constitution Committee and a Joint Committee on 
Human Rights (‘JCHR’) that have been extremely successful, and are widely 
acknowledged as vanguard models of legislative deliberation and authority as regards 
constitutional issues.16 Further, the standards and practices located in American law and 
constitutional review continue to have a large influence on Taiwanese adjudication.17 
While it is acknowledged that such legislatures operate in different constitutional structures, 
the main focus of this article is constitutional deliberation and review. All democratic 
legislatures can attempt to increase their constitutional interpretative authority, and 
Taiwan’s is no different.18 Searching for ideas is a matter of legal borrowing, in which law 
and legal institutions have a rich history. 19  Such borrowing is certainly apparent in 
                                                 
15 See notes 25 and 26 below.  
16 M de Visser, Constitutional Review in Europe (Hart, Oxford, 2014) pp 29–32, 83.  
17 Lo (note 7 above), p 3; LSL Liu, ‘Judicial Review and Emerging Constitutionalism: The Uneasy Case for 
the Republic of China on Taiwan’ (1991) 39 American Journal of Comparative Law 509 at 511, 515–516; 
See also N Chisolm, ‘The Faces of Judicial Independence: Democratic Versus Bureaucratic Accountability 
in Judicial Selection, Training, and Promotion in South Korea and Taiwan’ (2014) 62 American Journal of 
Comparative Law 893. 
18 Garrett and Vermeule (note 1 above), p 1292: ‘It seems indisputable that, on net, some congressional 
deliberation on constitutional questions is better than none at all. The real question is not whether deliberation 
is beneficial, but how much deliberation is optimal’. 
19 A Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law (2nd ed, University of Georgia Press, 
Athens, 1993), p 107.  
  
 
Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan.20 Taiwan borrows legal rules and statutes from across the 
globe—its legal system and constitutional review structure are a collection of various 
Japanese, US and European (predominately German) customs.21 Further, constitutional 
interpretative authority does not have to appear in statutory or constitutional (amendment) 
form—ideas other legislatures have implemented in regard to the practice may fit well with 
the Legislative Yuan or may motivate the Yuan to adopt similar or more innovative 
methods. 
 
II. The Dynamic Nature of Constitutional Review 
A. Overview 
Maartje de Visser notes that ‘[d]eciding on the institutional arrangements to enforce the 
supremacy of a constitution is often regarded as a veritable evergreen of constitutional 
law’. 22  Indeed, even in stable democracies, constitutional arrangements appear to 
constantly be changing.23 Questioning such arrangements is in fact part of the democratic 
process. Assessing whether a constitutional structure is properly working, however, is 
much more difficult to determine.  
Examples regarding the dynamic nature of constitutional structures arise in the 
jurisdictions consulted in this article. The UK currently operates on a system based around 
                                                 
20 During interviews the author also asked insiders about statutory borrowing. Many acknowledged the 
Legislative Yuan frequently did so, especially from (in no particular order) the US, UK, Germany and Japan.  
21 Lo (note 7 above), p 12; Ginsburg (note 6 above), pp 108 and 110; see also T Tetzlaff, ‘Kelsen’s Concept 
of Constitutional Review Accord in Europe and Asia: The Grand Justices in Taiwan’ (2006) 1 NTU Law 
Review 75.  
22 de Visser (note 16 above), p 1.  
23 D Oliver and C Fusaro (eds.), How Constitutions Change: A Comparative Study (Hart, Oxford, 2013), p 4. 
  
 
parliamentary supremacy and judges are not allowed to strike down acts of parliament.24 
Yet many believe judicial review and legal constitutionalism has strengthened in the UK 
since passage of the Human Rights Act 1998,25 or has gotten stronger for other reasons.26 
During this period of constitutional change, or perhaps in response to it, the Westminster 
Parliament inserted mechanisms to increase their constitutional assessment procedures of 
pending legislation, establishing two separate constitutional committees (one in the 
Commons27 and one in the Lords),28 and also adding the JCHR.29 Ultimately, however, 
there remains little question that the Westminster Parliament ‘has the final say on the 
compatibility of its laws with the UK constitution’.30  
Conversely, in the US judicial review of statutes played no role in constitutional 
review until Marbury v Madison.31 Subsequent to this expansive decision, the Supreme 
Court refused to strike down an act of Congress for over half a century.32 Yet nowadays it 
is common for the Court to strike down laws or specific provisions, as the powers of 
judicial review have been thoroughly strengthened. Congress has been much less 
                                                 
24 Although courts can now issue ‘statements of incompatibility’ with statutes that violate the Human Rights 
Act 1998.  
25 Bellamy (note 4 above), p 87; Elliott and Thomas (note 3 above), pp 38–41; D Oliver, ‘United Kingdom’, 
in Oliver and Fusaro (eds.) (note 23 above), pp 342 at 350–352.  
26 From an American perspective, see EF Delaney, ‘Judiciary Rising: Constitutional Change in the United 
Kingdom’ (2014) 108 Northwestern University Law Review 543. 
27 House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee.  
28 In regard to the House of Lords (‘HOL’) Constitution Committee, see A Le Sueur and J Simson Caird, 
‘The Lords Constitution Committee’, in A Horne, G Drewry and D Oliver (eds.), Parliament and the Law, 
(Hart, Oxford, 2013), pp 281–308. 
29 In regard to the JCHR, see M Hunt, ‘The Joint Committee on Human Rights’, in Horne, Drewry and Oliver 
(eds.), ibid, pp 223–250; P Norton ‘A Democratic Dialogue? Parliament and Human Rights in the United 
Kingdom’ (2013) 21 Asia Pacific Law Review 141. 
30 de Visser (note 16 above), p 83.  
31 5 U.S. 137 (1803). According to Thayer the Supreme Court did not strike down an act by a state legislature 
until 1814 (JB Thayer, ‘The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law’ (1893) 7 
Harvard Law Review 129 at 134).  
32 See Government Printing Office, Acts of Congress Held Unconstitutional in Whole or in Part by the 
Supreme Court of the United States, available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-CONAN-
2002/pdf/GPO-CONAN-2002-10.pdf.  
  
 
successful implementing constitutional legislative scrutiny mechanisms, and this could be 
one reason why strong judicial review has expanded significantly throughout the country’s 
history.33 Contrary to this judicial review uprising, during the past couple of decades a 
wave of constitutional scholars have advocated that legislatures—and citizens, more 
generally—play an increased role in the constitutional assessment of laws.34 
However some scholars may disagree with America’s constitutional structure being 
characterised as heavy on legal constitutionalism and strong judicial review. For example, 
Eskridge and Ferejohn contend that the US is largely ‘a republic of statutes’.35 They further 
argue the written constitution is becoming increasingly obsolete and the Supreme Court 
‘does not have the legitimacy, the wisdom and the expertise, or the enforcement resources 
to generate important changes in the Constitution’.36 Garrett and Vermeule also cite a long 
list of significant constitutional dimensions the Court leaves under Congressional 
surveillance, and therefore declines to review.37 Among these are: the procedural validity 
of constitutional amendments; the procedural validity of enacted statutes; the creation and 
validity of internal congressional rules; economic and social regulation; spending for the 
general welfare; delegation of rulemaking authority to Executive or agencies; division of 
war powers between Congress and the Executive; rules and regulations for the military; 
                                                 
33  For comprehensive accounts on the rise of judicial supremacy, see eg KE Whittington, Political 
Foundations of Judicial Supremacy (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2007); B Friedman and 
EF Delaney, ‘Becoming Supreme: The Federal Foundation of Judicial Supremacy’ (2011) 111 Columbia 
Law Review 1137. 
34 See note 1 above.  
35 WN Eskridge Jr and J Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes: The New American Constitution (Yale University 
Press, New Haven, 2010).  
36 Ibid, p 4.  
37 See Garrett and Vermeule (note 1 above), pp 1284–1285. 
  
 
confirmations and impeachments; and enforcement of the ‘Republican Form of 
Government’ clause.38  
Other jurisdictions present contemporary examples of how constitutional review 
structures regularly fluctuate. In 2003 Belgium’s Cour d’arbitrage gained powers to 
‘control whether statutes comply with all the fundamental rights and liberties laid down in 
the constitution’ and other legal principles;39 France amended its constitution in 2008 to 
allow for increased judicial review of promulgated laws;40 and controversially, Hungary 
has recently adopted a Fundamental Law that significantly curbs the powers of its 
constitutional court.41 Other democracies such as Canada,42 Germany43 and Switzerland44 
have experienced various levels of constitutional change over the past few decades, 
tinkering with structures to discover their ‘veritable evergreen’.45 Such change, however, 
need not be dramatic. Minor adjustments to such constitutional mechanisms can also play 
a significant part in review.46  After all, democracies are dynamic entities, and all-or-
nothing review by one branch of government—or merely one governmental entity—is not 
how such review usually functions,47 and would challenge the principles of democratic 
governance.  
                                                 
38 Ibid 
39 de Visser (note 16 above), p 57.  
40 Ibid, pp 60–61. 
41 Ibid, pp 74–75. Although this move has been heavily criticised both within Hungary and abroad.  
42 Oliver and Fusaro (eds.) (note 23 above), pp 9–10. Canada’s Supreme Court has ‘created unwritten yet 
justiciable constitutional principles’, including ‘a provision that disallows the unilateral secession of a 
province’. And Canada’s Parliament has created legislation that allows the provinces veto power over some 
constitutional amendments.  
43 Ibid, p 145. Germany amended the federal system in 2006 and 2009, and made further constitutional 
amendments permitting the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009.  
44 Ibid, p 303. Switzerland’s third Constitution came into force on 1 January 2000, 125 years after their 
second constitution.  
45 de Vissser (note 16 above), p 1. 
46 Vermeule (note 1 above), p 2: ‘The fact is that in most democratic polities, the basic constitutional 
arrangements are no longer up for grabs. …small scale institutional design is all that is on offer’. 
47 Elliott and Thomas (note 3 above), p 20. 
  
 
 
B.  Legislative interpretative authority 
Most theories of constitutionalism acknowledge the legislature’s interpretative authority, 
although such power varies by jurisdiction.48 That being said, de Visser writes that the 
study of parliamentary constitutional interpretation is ‘still in its infancy’.49 Parliamentary 
or congressional scrutiny of constitutional issues can arise or be supported because of many 
different rationales. In some cases this stems from a pledge by lawmakers upon taking 
office to uphold the constitution, 50  actively scrutinising the constitutionality of bills 
travelling through parliament (for example, the Westminster Parliament’s Lords 
Constitution Committee) or even merely from the duty of enacting bills into laws.51 
Inevitably legislators are constitutional actors; but unfortunately, sometimes they are not 
viewed as constitutional reviewers.  
Often the primary issue with enhanced constitutional scrutiny by legislatures is the 
complex interplay with the responsibilities of the judiciary.52 This is especially true in 
jurisdictions employing strong judicial review and a reliance on legal constitutionalism. 
Here legislatures are more likely to be stymied by the judiciary or impede themselves 
regarding their constitutional review efforts, rather than be aided by the judiciary as to how 
                                                 
48 Garrett and Vermeule (note 1 above), p 1306: ‘Normatively, most mainstream theories of constitutionalism 
deem congressional review for constitutionality to be an affirmative good, regardless of the scope of 
subsequent judicial review’. 
49 de Visser (note 16 above), p 23.  
50 HM Volokh, ‘Constitutional Authority Statements in Congress’ (2013) 65 Florida Law Review 177 at 183–
184; see also R Feingold, ‘Upholding an Oath to the Constitution: A Legislator’s Responsibilities’ (2006) 
Wisconsin Law Review 1.  
51 de Visser (note 16 above), p 23, writes: ‘Parliament as a whole must work within constitutional limits when 
performing its functions. This notably entails that constitutional rules, principles and values are respected 
during the drafting and enactment of new statutes’.  
52 See GJ Jacobsohn, ‘An Unconstitutional Constitution? A Comparative Perspective’ (2006) 4 International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 460 at 463. 
  
 
improvement could be made or responsibilities shared. Nonetheless, for jurisdictions that 
continue to employ strong judicial review, the ‘countermajoritarian difficulty’ ominously 
lingers.53  
Another issue is whether legislators feel the need for constitutional assessment of 
legislation and whether they perform adequately if such opportunities arise. Brest famously 
argues that ‘[o]ne can reasonably demand … that the lawmaking process take explicit 
account of constitutional values threatened by pending legislation’.54 Compared to writings 
on the countermajoritarian difficulty, 55  there is a dearth of research regarding how 
legislators feel about constitutional assessment and how well they perform such duties; yet 
there is some. After comparing two Congressional surveys (one from 1959 and another 
from 1999/2000), Peabody found that ‘Congress expresses a persistent and surprising 
interest in asserting a distinctive constitutional voice’. 56  Particularly important is the 
emergence of a new group of ‘joint constitutionalists’ in the 1999/2000 survey, who believe 
that ‘Congress and the courts should each interpret the Constitution conscientiously and 
independently, without necessarily deferring to the views of the other’.57 Further, Tushnet 
has found Congressional interpretation of constitutional issues to be ‘reasonably good’,58 
and notes it may be the case that the ‘imperfect congressional capacity to interpret the 
                                                 
53 Sometimes ‘bemoaned as the “central obsession” of constitutional scholarship’: EC Dawson, ‘Adjusting 
the Presumption of Constitutionality Based on Margin of Statutory Passage’ (2013) 16 University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 97 at 100. 
54 Brest (note 1 above), at 588.  
55 See generally AM Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics (2nd 
ed, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1986) and the copious amounts of literature this work has spawned.  
56 BG Peabody, ‘Congressional Attitudes Toward Constitutional Interpretation’, in Devins and Whittington 
(eds.) (note 1 above), p 40. Yet the author goes on to note, ‘although it has somewhat conflicted and 
underdeveloped views about how to achieve this aspiration’. 
57 Ibid, p 50.  
58 M Tushnet, ‘Evaluating Congressional Constitutional Interpretation: Some Criteria and Two Informal Case 
Studies’, in Devins and Whittington (eds.) (note 1 above), pp 269–270. 
  
 
Constitution is nonetheless better than the perhaps more imperfect judicial capacity to do 
so’.59  Yet many legislators and constitutional scholars continue to assert the case for 
judicial supremacy in regard to constitutional questions.60 This is most often expressed in 
jurisdictions with strong judicial review and could have much to do with the effects of 
judicial overhang.  
 
C.  Judicial overhang 
One of the circumstances resulting from strong judicial review and an over-focus on legal 
constitutionalism is the development of judicial overhang. Coined by Mark Tushnet, this 
occurs when legislators give ultimate constitutional deference to the courts, believing they 
will correct statutory mistakes.61 To some extent this development could promote disregard 
for the Constitution, as legislators and others may not ‘bother to interpret the constitution 
at all, much less interpret it well’.62 Ultimately Tushnet observes many pitfalls arising from 
this phenomenon. 
First, he states it promotes irresponsibility, in that legislators do not feel responsible 
for constitutional assessment63 and lawmakers may simply defer to the judiciary on major 
constitutional issues. As will be seen below, this type of thinking was apparent in the 
author’s interviews with Legislative Yuan members. Next, Tushnet believes it distorts 
legislation—if legislators focus too much on the Constitution inside the courts, they may 
                                                 
59 M Tushnet, ‘Is Congress Capable of Conscientious, Responsible Constitutional Interpretation?’ (2009) 89 
Boston University Law Review 499 at 500.  
60 See eg E Chemerinsky, ‘In Defense of Judicial Review: The Perils of Popular Constitutionalism’ (2004) 
University of Illinois Law Review 673; see also L Alexander and F Schauer, ‘On Extrajudicial Constitutional 
Interpretation’ (1997) 110 Harvard Law Review 1359 at 1377. 
61 Tushnet (note 1 above), p 57; see also Tushnet (note 59 above). 
62  Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights: Judicial Review and Social Welfare Rights in Comparative 
Constitutional Law (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2009), p 81.  
63 Ibid. 
  
 
produce unsatisfactory laws. 64  Lawmakers should focus more on policy, not on the 
Supreme Court or court-centred laws. The policy is the heart of the law and that should not 
be discarded. Tushnet further contends that judicial overhang distorts legislative 
discussion65 and could make lawmakers think in scrutiny levels (that is, strict scrutiny 
versus rational basis), and not in terms of fairness. He also writes that the US Executive 
Branch does a fair job of interpreting the constitution because of particular offices it houses, 
advocating that legislatures should try to develop these specialised offices as well.66 Finally, 
Tushnet believes judicial overhang misleads legislators, in that they may think their 
constitutional discussion should be similar to Supreme Court discussion. 67  Yet the 
Constitution’s text and the court cases surrounding it are not the only source of 
constitutional rights (for example, the right to privacy, not found in the US Constitution, 
has been advocated by the courts and also by the legislature). In fact, Tushnet argues that 
legislative discussion of the right to privacy ‘gave a firmer basis to such rights than the 
Court’s own decisions’.68 
Baxter takes the problems of judicial overhang further, noting that it ‘is not just a 
problem of metrics for those who would determine Congress’s capacity for constitutional 
interpretation. It is also, more importantly, a circumstance that likely prevents Congress 
from developing its capacity’.69 He further notes that ‘[r]eference to constitutional issues 
                                                 
64 Ibid, p 58. Emphasis in original.  
65 Ibid, pp 60–63.  
66 Ibid, pp 61–62. Here Tushnet cites the Office of Legal Counsel in the Department of Justice. Meanwhile, 
Ackerman also writes about this phenomenon, noting the establishment of the Office of Legal Counsel and 
the While House Counsel ‘have vastly increased [Executive] constitutional authority’, although he heavily 
criticises them: B Ackerman, The Decline and Fall of the American Republic (Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, 2010), pp 68, 87–88, 95–110.  
67 Tushnet (note 62 above), pp 63–65.  
68 Ibid, p 65.  
69 H Baxter, ‘A Comment on Mark Tushnet’s Some Notes on Congressional Capacity to Interpret the 
Constitution’ (2009) 89 Boston University Law Review 511.  
  
 
and concerns is a necessary, but not sufficient, criterion for adequate constitutional analysis. 
Having ‘the Constitution and constitutionalism in mind’ is not enough’. 70  Baxter’s 
criticisms coincide with this article’s main points: that Taiwan relies too heavily on judicial 
review and this is stifling constitutional discussion and scrutiny in the Legislative Yuan.  
 
D.  Legislative Yuan interpretative authority and the dominance of 
Taiwan’s Constitutional Court 
 
Above it was stated that Taiwan exercises strong judicial review with weak parliamentary 
authority in regard to constitutional matters and it was also noted that the Taiwanese 
standard of constitutional review has been heavily influenced by America’s. But critical 
structures of Taiwanese judicial review are much stronger than the US model. As Lo points 
out, the system of constitutional review in Taiwan is more similar to Germany and 
Austria.71 For one, direct interpretive authority for constitutional matters is not located in 
the US Constitution; the Court established this power through one of its own decisions.72 
Taiwan’s Constitutional Court contains this authority in abundance, firmly delineated in 
the Constitution.73 Further, Taiwan has a separate Constitutional Interpretation Procedure 
Act that details the procedures for interpretation of the constitution.74 That law makes no 
                                                 
70 Ibid, p 512. 
71 Lo (note 7 above), p 17. Although, even the German Constitutional Court was influenced by the American 
structure of constitutional review and the US Supreme Court (de Visser (note 16 above), p 64). 
72 Marbury v Madison 5 U.S. 137 [1803].  
73 See eg articles 78, 171 and 173. Article 78 provides: ‘The Judicial Yuan shall interpret the Constitution 
and shall have the power to unify the interpretation of laws and orders’; art 171: ‘Laws that are in conflict 
with the Constitution shall be null and void. When doubt arises as to whether or not a law is in conflict with 
the Constitution, interpretation thereon shall be made by the Judicial Yuan’; art 173: ‘The Constitution shall 
be interpreted by the Judicial Yuan’. 
74 Constitutional Interpretation Procedure Act (1993).  
  
 
mention of Legislative Yuan interpretive power besides their right to petition the 
Constitutional Court under Article 5(iii) of the Act.75 
Recall the earlier Elliott and Thomas quote on legal and political constitutionalism, 
that ‘[q]uite sensibly, few countries put all of their eggs in one basket’.76 Contrary to such 
sensibility, it appears ‘unequivocal’ that Taiwan has allocated constitutional review 
exclusively among the 15 staggered, fixed-term Justices of the Constitutional Court.77 
Although statutory and constitutional backing was already strong, throughout the years the 
Court significantly expanded its power through various decisions, providing further 
foundations by which judicial supremacy is exercised. Tom Ginsburg78 and Chien-Chih 
Lin79 offer impressively thorough accounts of how the court has expanded its reach, and 
Chien-Liang Lee interestingly grapples with many of the constitutional review dilemmas 
arising in Taiwan.80 Ginsburg notes this was performed in three stages: (1) establishing 
supremacy over the ordinary courts; (2) challenging governmental authority on 
administrative law matters; and (3) by avoiding Council Law restrictions. Further, 
Ginsburg writes that the Court decided to enhance enforcement of their decisions by 
providing dates for compliance: if such dates are not complied with, the law or regulation 
in question becomes null and void.81 Conversely, Lin notes the Court expanded its power 
                                                 
75 Article 5(iii) notes that: ‘The grounds on which the petitions for interpretation of the Constitution may be 
made are as follows: … 3. When one-third of the Legislators or more have doubt about the meanings of a 
constitutional provision governing their functions and duties, or question on the constitutionality of a statute 
at issue, and have therefor initiated a petition’. 
76 Elliott and Thomas (note 3 above), p 21. 
77 Judicial Yuan (J. Y.) Interpretation No 499 (24 March 2000), Holding, para 8: ‘It is, therefore, 
unequivocal that the Justices of the Judicial Yuan are charged with the power to interpret the Constitution 
and unify the interpretation of laws and statutes’. 
78 Ginsburg (note 6 above), pp 134–157.  
79 Lin (note 9 above).  
80 CL Lee, ‘A Comparative Study of Judicial Review Procedure Types—The Option of Constitutional 
Procedure System in Reform of the Constitutional Review of Taiwan’ (2010) 5 NTU Law Review 73.  
81 Ginsburg (note 6 above), pp 143–144. See also J.Y. Interpretation No 188 (noting that unless otherwise 
specified, interpretations come into effect immediately).  
  
 
through two methods: (a) being regarded as a guardian of constitutional and human rights; 
and (b) unabashedly expanding the scope and validity of their interpretations.82 However, 
this power expansion certainly did not develop without backlash from the Legislative Yuan 
and the Executive.83 
One relatively recent interaction between the Court and the Legislative Yuan left 
the latter weakened and the former emboldened. In response to the 319 Presidential 
assassination attempt the Kuomintang (‘KMT’) controlled legislature passed an act 
creating a commission to investigate the incident. 84  The law’s constitutionality was 
questioned by other members of the Legislative Yuan, who petitioned the Court to examine 
the matter. The Justices found much of the law unconstitutional, thus gutting the 319 
commission but upholding the legislature’s investigatory powers. 85  In doing so, the 
Justices emphatically stated they ‘will not be bound by the views held by petitioners or 
agencies concerned as to how the law should be applied’.86 This passage is similar to the 
statements made in Interpretation No 216, disregarding the views of Ministry of Justice 
attorneys on the constitutionality of legislation.87 But this incident did not end there. KMT 
legislators were so upset with Interpretation No 585 that in the following budget they 
deleted the ‘specialty premiums’ portion of the Justices’ salaries. 88  Members of the 
Legislative Yuan again petitioned the Court and the Justices responded by declaring the 
salary deletions unconstitutional, asserting that ‘no constitutional organ may delete or 
                                                 
82 Lin (note 9 above), pp 199–206. 
83 Ibid, pp 206–210.  
84 The Act of the Special Commission on the Investigation of the Truth in Respect of the 319 Shooting.  
85 J.Y. Interpretation No 585 (15 December 2004).  
86 Ibid. 
87 J.Y. Interpretation No 216 (19 June 1987): ‘Judicial administrations shall not put forth their own legal 
views and order judges to follow such views in the course of adjudication. If any legal views are presented, 
they are references for judges only and shall not bind judges in the course of adjudication’.  
88 The Justices salaries consist of a base salary, public expenses, and the specialty premiums.  
  
 
diminish the remuneration for a judge unless there is any ground for discipline’. 89 
Subsequently, the Legislative Yuan has been noticeably hesitant to challenge 
Constitutional Court authority.90 
That prominent exchange came during a period of rapid power expansion for the 
Court. In 1990 the Justices struck down a Temporary Provisions constitutional 
amendment,91 and a decade later they controversially struck down another constitutional 
amendment on the grounds of ‘improper processes’.92 The latter was perceived by some as 
revising, not interpreting, the Constitution. 93  While such negation of constitutional 
amendments infrequently occurs in democracies, it certainly is not unheard of. 94 Revisions 
to the Constitution in 2005 gave the Justices power to adjudicate impeachments of the 
president and to dissolve unconstitutional political parties, two spectacular powers not 
normally provided to courts in liberal democracies. 95  The Court also exerts a certain 
irresolute control over the political agenda in Taiwan, which scholars believe was gained 
in the late 1990s.96 
Some Constitutional Court interpretations forcefully, almost combatively, 
articulate the authority of the Constitutional Court.97  Interpretation No 185 notes that 
                                                 
89 J.Y. Interpretation No 601, Holding, para 2.  
90 Although, others note there was an attitude change after J.Y. Interpretation No 530 (in relation to whether 
the Judicial Yuan may enact trial rules or supervisory regulations on their own): see CT Lee, ‘Taiwan’s 
Legislators’ Attitude Toward Grand Justices Constitutional Interpretation’ (2012) 37 The Constitutional 
Review 488. 
91 J.Y. Interpretation No 261 (21 June 1990); Lin (note 9 above), p 203.  
92 J.Y. Interpretation No 499 (2000).  
93 Lin (note 9 above), p 203.  
94 See eg Jacobsohn (note 52 above), p 460.  
95 However other courts in liberal democracies (eg Germany), do have such powers. The ancillary powers of 
constitutional courts have risen dramatically since the early 20th century: T Ginsburg and Z Elkins, ‘Ancillary 
Powers of Constitutional Courts’ (2009) 87 Texas Law Review 1431 at 1440, 1443.  
96 Tetzlaff (note 21 above), p 9; for a more complete description of how the Court’s political power was 
attained, see Lin (note 9 above), pp 186–192. 
97 See note 77 above about the ‘unequivocal’ nature of their interpretative responsibilities.  
  
 
‘interpretations of the Judicial Yuan shall be binding upon every institution and person in 
the country, and each institution shall abide by the meaning of these interpretations in 
handling relevant matters’.98 Interpretation No 405 notes that Court interpretations are 
binding ‘regardless of whether the Interpretations concern the meaning of the Constitution, 
are solutions of disputes concerning the applicability of the Constitution or adjudication on 
the unconstitutionality of statutes’.99 These are audacious words for a Court that operates 
in a ‘constitutional democracy’ 100  and incorporates such principles as ‘representative 
politics’, ‘accountability of politics’ 101 and ‘legislative autonomy’102 into their decisions. 
As the Court made clear in their decision on the unconstitutionality of the 1999 
constitutional amendment, ‘not all parliamentary proceedings that are clearly and grossly 
flawed may take the pretext of being internal, self-regulatory matters and evade their legal 
consequences’.103 The meaning of ‘clearly and grossly flawed’, however, obviously comes 
down to the interpreter; in Taiwan, such discretion is solely in the purview of the 
Constitutional Court.  
Yet recent events may provide some hope for non-judicial interpretation. In 2009 
the Legislative Yuan enacted the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(‘ICCPR’) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(‘ICESCR’).104 Surprisingly, judicial review enforcement of the covenants was lacking. 
                                                 
98 J.Y. Interpretation No 185 (27 January 1984), Holding, para 1. Emphasis added.  
99 J.Y. Interpretation No 405 (7 June 1996), Reasoning, para 1. Emphasis added.  
100 J.Y. Interpretation No 585 (15 December 2004), Holding 5, para 5. 
101 Ibid, Holding 2, para 4.  
102 J.Y. Interpretation No 342 (8 April 1994), Holding, para 1. This decision notes that the Justices may 
intervene in legislative procedures if there is an ‘apparent violation’ of the constitution significant enough 
for them to do so: Lo (note 7 above), p 27.  
103 J.Y. Interpretation No 499, Holding, para 12.  
104 Act to Implement the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (22 April 2009). See WC Chang, ‘An Isolated Nation with Global-
  
 
Given the wide substantive nature of both covenants, their enactment may provide the 
Legislative Yuan and other non-judicial governmental entities with increased 
constitutional review authority. In particular, the implementing law notes that:  
All levels of governmental institutions and agencies should review laws, regulations, 
directions and administrative measures within their functions according to the two 
Covenants. All laws, regulations, directions and administrative measures incompatible to 
the two Covenants should be amended within two years after the Act enters into force by 
new laws, law amendments, law abolitions and improved administrative measures.105 
 
The deadline for reviews by governmental agencies was December 2011 and a December 
2012 report by a local NGO states that while some action by the Executive has taken place, 
‘the pace of review is clearly lagging behind, for which the executive and the legislature 
should bear joint responsibility’.106 The report goes on to single out the Legislative Yuan, 
explicitly noting its ‘agencies have not been checking for laws or administrative measures 
that violate the covenants’.107 While the Legislative Yuan still does not contain any official 
procedure by which the two covenants are assessed against pending legislation, remedying 
this situation is discussed in more detail below.  
 
III. Legislative Yuan Insider Responses 
A.  Interview details 
                                                 
minded Citizens: Bottom-up Transnational Constitutionalism in Taiwan’ (2009) 4 NTU Law Review 203 at 
211.  
105 Act to Implement the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (22 April 2009), art 8.  
106 Covenants Watch, ‘Taiwan Human Rights Report Parallel Report on the Core Document Forming Part of 
the Reports’, p 50 (14 December 2012).  
107 Ibid, p 51. However the judiciary has increasingly referenced human rights laws more after the statutory 
ratification of the treaties: WC Chang, ‘The Convergence of Constitutions and International Human Rights: 
Taiwan and South Korea in Comparison’ (2011) 36 North Carolina Journal of International Law and 
Commercial Regulation 593 at 602.  
  
 
To examine whether Legislative Yuan insiders actively assess the constitutionality of the 
bills they are drafting and voting on, the author conducted interviews with Legislative Yuan 
insiders in the summer and autumn of 2013.108 In all, he talked with 15 individuals:  
 Eight Lawmakers; 
 Six Legislative Assistants; and 
 One Bureau Drafter 
 
It is acknowledged that 15 individuals is not a representative sample of the Legislative 
Yuan. However the answers came from a diverse group of professionals with significant 
institutional experience in Legislative Yuan law-making. Going directly to such insiders 
provided insight regarding to what extent the legislature assesses the constitutionality of 
prospective laws, and how legislators and staff were going about this. In addition to others, 
the author asked two important questions during the interviews:  
(1) When drafting or proposing legislation, do you think about whether the statute is 
constitutional? 
 
(2) If you do have questions regarding the constitutionality of a statute, who do you 
ask, and/or who resolves these matters? 
 
The first question seeks to determine if legislators conscientiously assess constitutionality 
during the drafting process, while the second asks a more substantive question: where do 
legislators go with constitutional questions.  
 
B.  Thinking about constitutionality 
Some insiders proclaimed to actively think about constitutionality. For instance, one 
legislator noted, ‘I have more concern on human rights, democracy, and the constitutional 
                                                 
108 Most of these interviews were conducted in Chinese via an interpreter. Thus, the original answers have 
been twice translated from Chinese to English by research assistants and the most logical and accurate 
compilations were used. Should the original Chinese translations be desired, these can be proffered.  
  
 
structure or concept of constitutionalism ... so when I propose a bill, I will specifically 
make sure these concerns are being observed’.109 A couple of assistants supported this 
notion, one adding, ‘we will find constitutional law or the Grand Judges’ interpretation to 
support our argument’,110 while the other noted, ‘Yes, constitutionality is very fundamental, 
all the assistants and the experts take it into account’.111 
However, what the author tended to see more with this question was an assumed 
constitutionality, where insiders took for granted the constitutional content of their 
proposals. Even though many aspects of Taiwan’s Constitution remain exceedingly 
divisive, one legislator answered, ‘Oh, it always has to be within our constitutional 
framework, yeah—It’s not really that controversial. I mean our constitutional principles 
are quite clear’.112  Given the rate at which the Constitutional Court has struck down 
legislation in recent years, 113  it was surprising to hear one assistant state that ‘it’s 
impossible for us to present unconstitutional bills … It’s common sense to know whether 
it’s constitutional or not while drafting’.114 Further, another staffer noted that ‘Taiwan has 
a written law system and we strictly follow the levels of law, Constitutional Law, and other 
provisions. If the law or the authorising law are unconstitutional, it will be considered a 
joke’.115 Given the difficulty of assessing constitutionality in many cases, however, the 
disparaging of a particular proposal may not necessarily kill it or easily render it 
illegitimate. Finally, in connection with assumed constitutionality, one assistant stated, ‘yes, 
                                                 
109 Interview with Legislative Yuan Member No 3 (‘LYM3’) in Taipei, Taiwan (10 July 2013).  
110 Interview with Legislative Yuan Assistant No 2 (‘LYASST2’) in Taipei, Taiwan (22 October 2013). 
111 Interview with Legislative Yuan Assistant No 4 (‘LYASST4’) in Taipei, Taiwan (31 October 2013).  
112 Interview with Legislative Yuan Member No 1 (‘LYM1’) in Taipei, Taiwan (18 July 2013). 
113 See IIAS TCC database (note 10 above).  
114 Interview with Legislative Yuan Assistant No 6 (‘LYASST6’) in Taipei, Taiwan (9 October 2013).  
115 Interview with Legislative Yuan Assistant No 3 (‘LYASST3’) in Taipei, Taiwan (28 October 2013).  
  
 
we certainly consider this. People working here have legal backgrounds’, 116  while a 
lawmaker noted ‘[d]ue to my background in politics, constitutional law, and administrative 
law, I have no difficulty concerning the constitutionality of laws’.117 Yet having a legal 
background and actively assessing the constitutionality of legislation are two quite separate 
things, and one is not necessarily predicated upon the other.  
 
C.  Where do offices go with constitutional questions?  
 
Since the initial question focused on how lawmakers perceive themselves as complying 
with constitutional norms in the legislative and larger legal processes, the second question 
asked a more structural question in regard to constitutional issues: where legislators (and 
staff) can go with constitutional questions. A couple of legislators noted they would consult 
colleagues, friends, and other acquaintances. One said ‘I will seek consultations with my 
friends in legal circles or even colleagues (at the Legislative Yuan). If necessary, we can 
seek aid from other experts, but we ourselves could make a sufficient argument’,118 while 
another stated, ‘there is a name list in my office, including professors, lawyers and other 
consultants. So if we or other legislators in my party find there might be some problem 
with the law, we will invite familiar consultants to offer opinions or even ask what kind of 
standpoint we should hold in the first and second reading’.119 Thus, consultation with 
regard to constitutional issues did happen for some legislators. It is important to point out, 
however, that these consultations are based on the quality of the individuals those people 
                                                 
116 Interview with Legislative Yuan Assistant No 1 (‘LYASST1’), in Taipei, Taiwan (30 October 2013).  
117 Interview with Legislative Yuan Member No 6 (‘LYM6’) in Taipei, Taiwan (17 July 2013).  
118 Interview with LYM3 (note 109 above).  
119 Interview with Legislative Yuan Member No 5 (‘LYM5’) in Taipei, Taiwan (9 July 2013).  
  
 
were asking and that there is not an ‘official’ office, agency or organisation legislators can 
consult regarding constitutional questions.  
Assistants, however, provided a somewhat different perspective. While one noted 
their office usually ‘consult[s] law professors’,120 others presented a disturbing lack of 
options in regard to exploring constitutional questions. One said, ‘usually we won’t ask’,121 
while another peculiarly added, ‘when a law is unconstitutional, it’s actually not too 
difficult to understand’.122 Further, an experienced assistant noted:  
Sometimes, legislators do not care about the constitutionality or whether it’s going to pass 
or not; they care more about media exposure or whether certain groups feel that the 
legislator is contributing something for them. In our office, we pay much attention to the 
fundamental constitutional rules as much as possible.123 
 
            Exhibiting signs of judicial overhang, a few participants displayed overt nods to 
Taiwan’s Constitutional Court. One staffer suggested that if one doubts the 
constitutionality of a bill, ‘he or she needs to petition for interpretation, instead of 
interpreting it on his or her own’.124 Another lawmaker stated something similar, noting, 
‘if we have a very controversial case that means we have to ask the constitutional court, or 
[if] we have made the law and find that it’s very controversial, or maybe [we] have different 
opinions among the society or general public, then we can call for the joint proposal from 
different legislators and then we can send it to the Constitutional Court’.125 These answers 
demonstrate the deference that some have for the Constitutional Court and its powerful but 
passive role in the law-making process.  
                                                 
120 Interview with LYASST4 (note 111 above).  
121 Interview with LYASST3 (note 115 above).  
122 Interview with LYASST1 (note 116 above).  
123 Interview with Legislative Yuan Assistant No 5 (‘LYASST5’) in Taipei, Taiwan (12 November 2013).  
124 Interview with LYASST3 (note 115 above).  
125 Interview with Legislative Yuan Member No 7 (‘LYM7’) in Taipei, Taiwan (14 and 26 November 2013).  
  
 
And yet, among the responses there were also calls for reform. One lawmaker 
pointedly noted: 
It is paramount to check if all the laws conform to the constitution, human rights, and this 
is especially true after we ratified ICCPR and ICESCR. There should be an organisation to 
monitor that all the passed law conforms to the standards of constitutions and conventions. 
However, there is currently no such organisation. We always hope to transform this 
system.126  
 
From the interviewees’ answers above it is apparent that Legislative Yuan insiders do not 
have a well-developed sense of constitutional interpretative authority as bills are travelling 
through the legislative process. Importantly, the legislature lacks any formal mechanisms 
that may either enhance constitutional scrutiny or spark constitutional debate and some 
interviewees displayed overt evidence of judicial overhang. Thus, the following section 
provides proposals for the Legislative Yuan and the Constitutional Court going forward.  
 
IV. Proposals for the Legislative Yuan and the Constitutional 
Court 
 
Below specific recommendations are provided that hopefully increase the Legislative 
Yuan’s interpretative authority, and in doing so, increases Taiwan’s political 
constitutionalism. Three of the proposals solely concern the parliament, while the final 
suggestions affect the Constitutional Court.  
 
A.  Legislative Yuan proposals 
First, the implementation of a legislative or parliamentary counsel that can aid legislators 
in drafting and scrutinising legislation should be established. Interviewees revealed that 
                                                 
126 Interview with Legislative Yuan Member No 4 (‘LYM4’) in Taipei, Taiwan (18 July 2013).  
  
 
they often get outside help for drafting bills, such as from law professors or from NGOs. 
Although the legislature is relatively young, it was a bit surprising to find the Legislative 
Yuan without such an office. Other unicameral legislatures, such as the Scottish 
Parliament 127  and Hong Kong Legislative Council 128  are equipped with such offices. 
Sometimes the Legislative Research Bureau is mentioned as a comparable organisation, 
but most of the interviewees made it clear that that office focuses on legislative research, 
and does not officially engage in aiding legislators with their drafting responsibilities.129 
Parliamentary counsel offices are essential to contemporary legislatures: they 
professionalise the drafting of bills and laws, aid legislators through the drafting and 
legislative process,130 and can even advise legislators on some of the constitutional and 
policy dimensions of their proposals.131 Usually composed of trained attorneys, the offices 
provide highly specialised individuals to aid legislators and their staff in the drafting 
process. Also, it has been previously noted that such offices help to keep the focus of 
statutory text on neutral legal language, rather than incorporating overtly political 
                                                 
127  See The Scottish Government, Office of the Scottish Parliamentary Counsel, available at 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/About/People/strategic-board/Finance/OSPC.  
128 HK Law Drafting Division, Department of Justice, How Legislation is Made in Hong Kong, available at 
http://www.doj.gov.hk/eng/public/pdf/2012/Drafter_booke.PDF. 
129 The Legislative Research Bureau (‘LRB’) does good work, but they are not a legislative drafting office. 
They are primarily a research office that reports on the effects or potential effects of legislation. Work from 
the LRB can be found at http://www.ly.gov.tw/05_orglaw/search/lawSearch.action.  
130 For a description of how the Westminster Parliamentary Counsel operates, see D Greenberg, Craies on 
Legislation (Sweet and Maxwell, London 2012), 5.1.1, pp 225–257.  
131 Daniel Greenberg, Laying Down The Law: A Discussion of the People, Processes and Problems that 
Shape Acts of Parliament (Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2011), pp 19–33; see also R Hazell, ‘Who is the 
Guardian of Legal Values in the Legislative Process: Parliament or the Executive?’ (2004) Public Law 495 
at 495: ‘in the absence of a higher law by which a sovereign Parliament in bound, the concept of legal policy 
as interpreted by Parliamentary Counsel is as close as our system has traditionally come to a check on the 
‘constitutionality’ of legislation’. 
  
 
language.132 Creating such an office would bring the legislature in line with many other 
long-established law-making bodies.  
Second, for every proposed bill the Legislative Yuan should require some type of 
statements of compatibility with the ratified ICCPR and ICESCR. These relatively minor 
adjustments can be easily made to the standing orders of the Legislative Yuan, and cost 
little in terms of implementation. Additionally, incorporating such statements could spark 
debate and get legislators actively thinking about their proposals in terms of constitutional 
and human rights issues,133 which was noticeably lacking in the interview data. Taking this 
step would also demonstrate to Taiwan’s Constitutional Court and perhaps even to 
international organisations (such as the United Nations), that Taiwan’s legislature is taking 
human rights seriously. 
Next, a standing or ad hoc Constitutional Committee should be developed in the 
Legislative Yuan134 which can discuss and debate significant constitutional issues that arise 
in the legislative process in regard to bills and other issues. Composition of the committee 
should be multi-partisan, in that it would be composed of members of each political party 
and no one political party would have majority powers. Thus, minority views would be 
actively and overtly heard. The committee could operate on the same principles the Yuan 
currently does for requesting the Constitutional Court to examine an issue: the ‘one-third 
vote’ principle could be the standard for review.135 Additionally, the committee should not 
be able to hold legislation back, but merely make recommendations on how it can be 
                                                 
132  BC Jones, ‘Processes, Standards and Politics: Drafting Short Titles in the Westminster Parliament, 
Scottish Parliament and U.S. Congress’ (2013) 25(1) Florida Journal of International Law 57. 
133 Norton writes that the JCHR has made Parliament more sensitive to human rights and has also 
influenced judicial decision-making: Norton (note 29 above), pp 158 and 162). 
134  There is currently an ad hoc Constitutional Amendment Committee that only convenes when a 
constitutional amendment is put forward.  
135 Constitutional Interpretation Procedure Act, art 5(iii). 
  
 
improved, in order to enhance constitutional scrutiny and discussion in the legislative 
stages. Establishing a committee of this magnitude would place the Legislative Yuan 
amongst the forefront of legislative bodies that take constitutional scrutiny seriously and 
would increase constitutional deliberation in the law-making process. While Westminster 
has two major committees that do this (Lords Constitution Committee, Commons Political 
and Constitutional Reform Committee), not even the long-established US Congress has a 
comparable committee that tackles constitutional issues in this manner.  
A couple of important admonitions for any attempts at increasing interpretative 
authority in the Legislative Yuan: change often arrives slowly and respect needs to be 
earned. If one or more of the recommendations taken above are implemented, such changes 
(especially those of a parliamentary committee),136 take time to mature and grow into 
effective constitutional reviewers and guardians of fundamental rights. 137  However, it 
should not be forgotten that constitutional change is possible and frequently occurs. Just a 
decade ago in the UK, the Executive used to be known as the branch that protected legal 
and fundamental rights in the legislative process. Now it is primarily Parliament that does 
so, primarily because of the establishment of the JCHR and the Lords Constitution 
Committee.138 
 
B.  Constitutional Court appointments and formal acknowledgement of 
legislative authority 
 
                                                 
136 Norton’s 2013 article demonstrates that such committees can be effective if they actively scrutinise 
enough legislation and earn the respect of their colleagues, the courts and the government: Norton (note 29 
above).  
137 See Le Sueur and Caird (note 28 above), speaking about the evolution of the Lords Constitution 
Committee. 
138 Hazell (note 131 above). 
  
 
Finally, there are the issues of Constitutional Court appointments 139  and formal 
acknowledgement of Legislative Yuan authority. While the nomination criteria was 
recently changed (4 February 2015), the second appointment criterion for justices on the 
Constitutional Court previously listed nine years of Legislative Yuan membership as one 
possible avenue of becoming a justice.140 Even though it was seldom used throughout the 
years,141 and subsequently repealed, the fact this criterion was present since 1947 provides 
relatively solid footing that experienced members of the legislature, and also the institution 
itself, possess at least some constitutional interpretative authority.  
There is another, less formative, avenue for seasoned politicians with scholarly 
records to ascend to the Court. Section six states that those with notable scholarly 
achievement in legal research and with political experience may also become justices.142 
Nominations under this section have produced 17 justices since 1985,143 although the 
political experience for many of these candidates usually amounted to being government 
officials of some sort and not democratically elected members of a legislative body. 
Nevertheless, it would be wise for future candidates with significant scholarly achievement 
and elected political experience (that is, Legislative Yuan members, mayors, city council 
members etc), to receive nominations to the Court.  
                                                 
139 Justices are nominated by the President and confirmed by the Legislative Yuan. 
140 (Pre 4 February 2015) Organic Act of the Judicial Yuan, art 4, para 1:  ‘… (2). Have served as a Member 
of the Legislative Yuan for more than nine years with distinguished contributions …’. 
141  Historically, only one candidate ascended to the bench based on the section two criteria, and that 
appointment took place nearly 30 years ago (in 1985): Justice Lee Chih-Peng (李志鵬) (1985–1994). For 
this I am indebted to Institutum Iurisprudentiae, Academia Sinica Assistant Professor Tzung-Mou Wu. See 
also the IIAS TCC Database (note 10 above).  
142 Organic Act of the Judicial Yuan, art 4, para 1: ‘… (5). Be a person highly reputed in the field of legal 
research and have political experience’. 
143 IIAS TCC Database (note 10 above). This figure is equal to the nominations from s 1(17) and also s 3(17) 
during the same time period.  
  
 
Given the importance of the previous section two and current section six 
appointment articles, two changes need to occur going forward: (1) more nominations to 
the Constitutional Court should be made from those with elected political experience in 
general (preferably from the Legislative Yuan); and (2) the Constitutional Court should 
formally acknowledge the Legislative Yuan also contains some amount, however limited, 
of constitutional review powers. As noted above, merely having one branch of government 
as sole constitutional adjudicators is unhealthy for a fully-functioning democracy. 144 
Upholding the constitution involves multiple branches and actors and it is the interplay 
between these entities that determines a country’s constitutional foundation. 
Acknowledging this would help bridge the wide divide between political and legal 
constitutionalism in Taiwan, and decrease the inherent problems of the countermajoritarian 
difficulty.  
It should also be emphasised that many of the Court’s foundational opinions and 
expansion of judicial review powers occurred before the Legislative Yuan was fully elected. 
While it may prove more appropriate to constrain and consolidate the powers of other 
governmental branches during a period of autocratic leadership, it is quite another to 
continue to do so when the legislature and the president are democratically elected. 
Continuing with the precedents and doctrine established in the provincial period, without 
a thorough re-examination of some major opinions, is troubling and unhealthy to 
democracy; the reality of an elected legislature passing laws through the will of the people 
should be fully taken into consideration by the Court.  
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strike down statutes.  
  
 
 
C.  Barriers to reform 
While at least some reform is necessary in Taiwan, many barriers may prevent it. First, 
members of the Legislative Yuan may find the above proposals unnecessary. Such are the 
effects of judicial overhang. Perhaps legislators believe their constitutional review scrutiny 
already operates at acceptable levels or perhaps they feel that constitutional review does 
not form part of their remit. This may indeed be the case, given the constitutional and 
statutory provisions that explicitly state the role of the Judicial Yuan in interpreting the 
Constitution.145  
Of course, the above recommendations also contain budget and legislative 
processes constraints. The introduction of a parliamentary counsel would indeed require 
necessary appropriations, and the introduction of a constitutional committee would require 
a significant amount of resources to be allocated. The committee would have to be staffed 
and worked into the operation of the Legislative Yuan and the practicalities of the 
constitutional committee and how those would operate would also have to be taken into 
consideration. Also, some of the ideas may not structurally fit into the Legislative Yuan. 
Westminster and Congress are both bicameral and Taiwan’s legislature is unicameral.146 
Thus, incorporating a constitution committee may prove overly-burdensome for the law-
making body, and could potentially delay legislation for various reasons if the committee 
is overwhelmed or inadequately staffed.  
                                                 
145 See notes 73 and 74 above. 
146 Bicameral arrangements may give rise to better constitutional review, especially in upper houses, which 
are usually ‘somewhat removed from the hubbub of daily politics and devoting more attention to the 
constitutional dimension of legislation’: de Visser (note 16 above), p 25. 
  
 
Finally, barriers may arise because of negative perceptions of Legislative Yuan 
members. A recent conference held by the Brookings Institution in Washington DC, noted 
that the fist fights among lawmakers negatively impacted foreign perceptions of the 
legislature,147 and during the same conference a member of the policy think-tank Taipei 
Forum said it was an ‘open secret’ in Taiwan that legislators were ‘weak, lazy and 
ineffective’.148 Scholars have even disparaged Taiwanese politicians, calling them ‘outlaw 
legislators’.149  These negative perceptions could certainly play a role in the potential 
expansion (or status quo) regarding the constitutional review authority of the Legislative 
Yuan.  
 
V. Conclusion 
Whoever hath an absolute authority to interpret any 
written or spoken laws, it is he who is truly the 
lawgiver, to all intents and purposes, and not the 
person who first wrote or spoke them.150 
 
Some may read this article and say that Taiwan is a young democracy, still attempting to 
determine its structure and mechanics of constitutional governance. Thus, there is little 
need to make reforms in regard to legislative interpretative authority and political versus 
legal constitutionalism. Such arguments are obtuse and irrelevant. These types of 
discussions are essential, especially in young democracies. If they are left for a later period 
                                                 
147 Statement by Richard Bush, ‘Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan: Oversight or Overreach, Brookings Institution’, 
available at http://www.brookings.edu/events/2014/06/23-taiwan-legislative-yuan.  
148 William Lowther, ‘Taipei Forum’s Su Chi denounces “weak, lazy, ineffective” legislature at US forum’, 
Taipei Times, 25 June 2014.  
149 J Martin, ‘Legitimate Force in a Particularistic Democracy: Street Police and Outlaw Legislators in the 
Republic of China on Taiwan’ (2013) 38(3) Law & Social Inquiry 615. However, Martin was mostly referring 
to local level politicians.  
150 English Bishop Hoadly’s Sermon preached before the King, 31 March 1717, as quoted in Thayer (note 33 
above), at 152.  
  
 
the current overreliance on legal constitutionalism will become even more firmly 
entrenched, thus diminishing the chances for change at a later date. Further, the changes 
advocated here in regard to constitutional review are practical and realistic. In fact they are 
much less dramatic than ‘abolishing judicial review’151 or even laying out a ‘case against 
judicial review’,152 proposed by two very highly respected constitutional law scholars.  
Ultimately, Taiwan must address the pitfalls of the countermajoritarian difficulty 
and judicial overhang and it must confront its over-reliance on legal constitutionalism. This 
is especially apparent if Taiwan continues with the status quo, allowing the Constitutional 
Court, as wise, just and respected as they may be, to adjudicate the most important issues 
of the day. At some point a more perfect balance between legal and political 
constitutionalism must develop, and there is no reason for the Legislative Yuan to hold 
back on this for maturity’s sake.  
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